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What has happened since the furore broke over 
the corporate land rush in Africa? Field-based 
research has exposed new realities that challenge 
the linear suggestions of a ‘grab’. As the process 
unfolds and our understanding deepens, the 
single narrative of the ‘land grab’ fractures into 
multiple messy elements. new perspectives have 
emerged, which reinforce the view that such a grab 
is underway, yet complicate our understanding of 
who is doing this, why, how, where and with what 
results. At the same time, a ‘governance rush’ has 
seen a proliferation of international frameworks that 
try to regulate, rather than stop, corporate and elite 
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In the past decade, the global academic and activist 
worlds have witnessed a rapid explosion of evidence 
and debates concerning a ‘global land grab’. The recent 
growth in large-scale land deals has been attributed to 
the crises in global food, fuel and financial systems that 
have combined to raise the perceived value of farmland 
as a productive resource as well as an investment 
commodity. While there is relatively broad consensus 
concerning the drivers of the trend, its dynamics, 
outcomes and significance remain the centre of heated 
debate. Diverse characterisations of what was underway 
represented this variously as a corporate takeover 
or, more euphemistically, the ‘rising interest in global 
farmland’. What was widely agreed was that:
• A qualitatively and quantitatively new era of 
privatisation and commercialisation was underway
• An abuse of power by national host governments and 
local intermediaries as well as foreign investors was 
leading to the loss of resources for local people in the 
areas targeted for investment and
• While substantial transformations were also underway 
in Southeast Asia and parts of Latin America, the 
reported deals suggested that Africa was at the 
centre of this global trend.
In this period, with mounting and damaging evidence 
of investments flouting human rights standards 
and dispossessing local people of land and water, 
contestation has evolved over who will define the 
processes to regulate investments in African farmland 
and other key natural resources. From the Food and 
Agricultural organization’s (FAo’s) Committee on World 
Food Security to the World Bank, the African Union 
and group of Eight (g8), there has been a proliferation 
of initiatives to respond to this. These initiatives have 
sought to curb the dispossession and displacement that 
such investments have produced, while also enabling 
the transfer of land and other resource rights to allow 
new investments that hold the promise of increasing 
agricultural productivity and contributing to food security 
at national, regional and global levels.
global rights groups, campaigning organisations, 
African civil farmers’ associations, rural movements 
and non-governmental organisations (ngos) have 
supported some of these initiatives (such as the African 
Union process and, by and large, the FAo process) 
while challenging others (such as the World Bank 
process) which they see as promoting self-regulation 
by the private sector investors. They have argued that a 
‘code of conduct’ approach, rather than reversing the 
resource grab, will facilitate it. Supported by several 
international ngos and campaigning organisations, 
peasant movements and others have intensified their 
opposition to corporate expansion as the route to 
agricultural commercialisation. They have argued 
instead for investments in local farmers. This counter 
movement challenges the dominant concept of food 
security that underpins this new phase of private 
investment in African agriculture; a concept which 
centres on increasing total factor productivity and 
aggregate output at the national level. An alternative 
conception is one of food sovereignty and, allied to that, 
land sovereignty. These notions are contested even 
within these movements, but, in Africa, have found little 
traction outside civil society groups that have built links 
with similar groups elsewhere, in Latin America and 
Southeast Asia.
As the master narrative of the ‘land grab’ – or more 
broadly the ‘resource grab’ – was interrogated through 
extensive field-based research across many African 
countries, new realities emerged that challenged the 
linear suggestions of a ‘grab’. Reality subverts each 
element of this neat storyline. As the process unfolds 
and our understanding deepens, the single narrative of 
the ‘land grab’ fractures into multiple messy elements. 
new perspectives have emerged. These reinforce the 
view that such a grab is underway, yet complicate our 
understanding of who is doing this, why, how, where 
and with what results. Five such themes relate to the 
resources being lost or acquired:
• Does the ‘land grab’ in fact constitute a ‘water grab’?
• What is the significance of domestic and small-scale 
acquisitions in comparison to foreign acquisitions?
• Is the growing social and economic differentiation 
being driven by these investments, as some people 
benefit and others lose out?
• What are the consequences of the financialisation of 
agriculture and the entry of new financial sector actors 
seeking to convert natural resources into financial 
commodities for trade and profit?
• What is the relationship between resource grabs 
and market expansion by corporations involved in 
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In the diversity of all these situations, the resource grab 
needs to be understood as highly fractured, with diverse 
drivers, actors, interests and outcomes.
The debate on the ‘land grab’ or resource grab 
underway in Africa – its scale, significance, impact and 
necessary responses – has evolved rapidly since 2008 
and, I argue, has been in part captured by the growing 
‘governance’ agenda. It is now widely accepted that, in 
recent years, ‘investments’ in Africa have amounted to 
a resource grab, rather than a ‘win-win’ arrangement for 
all parties. Reports by a broad spectrum of institutions 
have presented damning evidence of the negative 
impacts of large-scale land leasing and concessions, 
giving mainstream credibility to the charge that ‘land 
grabs’ were underway. But this quickly gave way to a 
multiplicity of initiatives driven by northern governments, 
development agencies and financial institutions – and 
even corporate investors themselves – to regulate the 
resource grab rather than to stop or reverse it. In other 
words, they addressed how to improve the governance 
of transactions without challenging the direction 
of change in who controls resources. Premised 
on narratives of global scarcity and the compelling 
argument that Africa urgently needs private investment 
in agriculture to feed itself and the world, such initiatives 
have shifted the terrain of debate away from how to 
stop the resource grab. Instead, they focus on how 
to promote land-based investments in a responsible 
manner and to regulate how land, water and other 
natural resources are transacted and rights transferred 
from existing users to new ones.
This article reviews changes in rights to land and water 
in Africa, the growing demand for these resources, and 
their development outcomes – above all for poor people 
who depend on these resources for their livelihoods. It 
outlines the main drivers and outcomes of the ‘resource 
grab’ in Africa and how these have changed in the 
last eight to ten years. It explores the debates about 
whether land deals constitute ‘investment’ or ‘grabs’ 
of Africa’s land and water. Such debates arise not only 
from incomplete information (though that remains a 
challenge), but also from opposing political beliefs and 
conceptions of ‘development’ and ‘food security’. Finally, 
the paper explores what the policy implications are for 
African states that face contradictory demands within 
their domestic constituencies. Also it explores these 
policy implications in the context of the growing number 
of public–private partnerships and a proliferation of 
regulatory frameworks; strategic questions for civil 
society and activist organisations that campaign for 
resource rights.
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1 
Introduction
In the past decade, the global academic and activist 
worlds have witnessed a rapid explosion of evidence 
and debates concerning a ‘global land grab’. The rapid 
increase in large-scale land deals has been attributed 
to crises in global food, fuel and financial systems that 
have combined to raise the perceived value of farmland 
as a productive resource as well as an investment 
commodity (Cotula et al., 2009; Borras et al., 2011; 
Arezki et al., 2013; kaag and Zoomers, 2014). While 
there is relatively broad consensus concerning the 
drivers of the trend, its dynamics, outcomes and 
significance remain the centre of heated debate. Diverse 
characterisations of what was underway represented 
this variously as a corporate takeover (gRAIn, 2008) 
or, more euphemistically, as the ‘rising interest in global 
farmland’ (Deininger and Byerlee, 2011). What was 
widely agreed was that:
• A qualitatively and quantitatively new era of 
privatisation and commercialisation was underway
• The abuse of power by national host governments and 
local intermediaries as well as foreign investors was 
leading to the loss of resources for local people in the 
areas targeted for investment
• While substantial transformations were also underway 
in Southeast Asia and parts of Latin America, the 
reported deals suggested that Africa was at the 
centre of this global trend (Deininger and Byerlee, 
2011, Land Matrix, 2014).
In this period, with mounting and damaging evidence 
of investments flouting human rights standards 
and dispossessing local people of land and water, 
contestation has evolved over who will define the 
processes to regulate investments in African farmland 
and other key natural resources (Margulis et al., 2013). 
From the FAo’s Committee on World Food Security 
to the World Bank, the African Union and group of 
Eight (g8), there has been a proliferation of initiatives 
to respond to this. These initiatives sought to curb the 
dispossession and displacement that such investments 
have produced, while also enabling the transfer of land 
and other resource rights to enable new investments 
that hold the promise of increasing agricultural 
productivity and contributing to food security at national, 
regional and global levels.
global rights groups, campaigning organisations, 
African civil farmers’ associations, rural movements 
and ngos have supported some of these initiatives 
(such as the African Union process and, by and large, 
the FAo process) while challenging others (such as 
the World Bank process), which they see as promoting 
self-regulation by the private sector investors. They have 
argued that a ‘code of conduct’ approach, rather than 
reversing the resource grab, will facilitate it (Borras 
and Franco, 2010). Supported by several international 
ngos and campaigning organisations, peasant 
movements and others have intensified their opposition 
to corporate expansion as the route to agricultural 
commercialisation. They have argued instead for 
investments in local farmers. This counter-movement 
challenges the dominant concept of food security 
that underpins this new phase of private investment in 
African agriculture; a concept that centres on increasing 
total factor productivity and aggregate output at the 
national level. An alternative conception is one of 
food sovereignty and, allied to that, land sovereignty 
(Edelman et al., 2014). These notions are contested 
even within these movements, but, in Africa, have found 
little traction outside civil society groups that have built 
links with similar groups elsewhere, in Latin America and 
Southeast Asia.
IIED WorkIng papEr
   www.iied.org     7
This article reviews the changes in rights to land 
and water in Africa, the growing demand for these 
resources, and their development outcomes – above 
all for poor people who depend on these resources 
for their livelihoods. It outlines the main drivers and 
outcomes of the ‘resource grab’ in Africa and how 
these have changed in the last eight to ten years. 
It explores the debates about whether land deals 
constitute ‘investment’ or ‘grabs’ of Africa’s land and 
water. Such debates arise not only from incomplete 
information (though that remains a challenge), but 
also from opposing political beliefs and conceptions 
of ‘development’ and ‘food security’. Finally, the paper 
explores what the policy implications are for African 
states that face contradictory demands within their 
domestic constituencies. It also explores the policy 
implications in the context of the growing number 
of public–private partnerships and a proliferation of 
regulatory frameworks; strategic questions for civil 
society and activist organisations that campaign for 
resource rights.
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2 
Evolution of the debate
The debate on the ‘land grab’ or resource grab 
underway in Africa, its scale, significance, impact and 
necessary responses, has evolved rapidly since 2008 
and, I argue, has been in part captured by the growing 
‘governance’ agenda.
The first phase of the land grab debate centred 
on drawing from anecdotal and media reports, 
development indicators and metrics to understand the 
scale and distribution of land grabs. Examples include 
the gRAIn briefing paper ‘Seized! The 2008 land grab 
for food and financial security’, based on a compilation 
of media reports (gRAIn, 2008), and other research 
reports (von Braun and Meinzen-Dick, 2009; Cotula 
et al., 2009; Smaller and Mann, 2009). The work of 
compiling data continues, with the re-launch of the 
Land Matrix1 in 2014, now with more traceable data 
and clear parameters – for example, only deals larger 
than 200 ha are included. Since many deals are still 
under negotiation and others have failed, only 957 land 
deals are now recorded as ‘concluded’ on the Land 
Matrix. Southeast Asia is the region with the highest 
number of concluded deals (299), followed by East 
Africa with (251) (see Figure 1). West Africa has fewer 
(118), while the data for Southern Africa show far fewer 
concluded deals (5). This draws into question the 
dataset itself, given the extent of the known deals in, for 
example, Mozambique and Zambia (Hall, 2011). The 
disputes over how to count land deals sit astride a more 
fundamental question of how to define them, producing 
widely divergent pictures emerging from these efforts 
at quantification (Edelman, 2013; oya 2013a; Scoones 
et al., 2013).
While being cognisant of concerns about methodology 
in all the quantitative measures of land deals, the 
available Land Matrix data does show some clusters 
that suggest spatial and political trends worthy of 
interrogation. not surprisingly, countries that do not 
feature strongly are those with low rainfall and extensive 
arid rangelands (namibia, Botswana and much of the 
Sahel and north Africa), those experiencing major civil 
conflict (Central African Republic) or where farmland 
is largely already privately titled (South Africa). on the 
basis of the extent of land under negotiation or already 
acquired through concluded deals (see Figure 2), the 
countries that initially appeared to be at the centre 
of the ‘land grab’ were South Sudan, Mozambique, 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Congo. 
While diverse, they have in common extensive 
indigenous forests and high rainfall areas. But while 
deals may be agreed in conflict zones, they may not 
materialise until conditions become more conducive 
to commercial operations, as has been seen in South 
Sudan over the past few years (Deng, 2013). While 
Ethiopia and Mozambique are the countries with the 
most deals, to date the transactions involving the 
largest areas have taken place in South Sudan, DRC, 
Mozambique and Liberia (see Figure 2). Relative to 
its size, the transactions in Liberia have involved the 
largest area.
Interesting as these quantitative measures are, they 
are also problematic in that they obscure important 
differences in the value and (actual or potential) use of 
the land transacted. Scoones et al. (2013: p. 469) draw 
attention to the ‘politics of evidence’ surrounding land 
deals, identifying ‘a profound uncertainty about what it is 
that is being counted’. They question the methods used 
to collate and aggregate land grab data and call for ‘a 
second phase of land grab research which abandons 
the aim of deriving the total number of hectares in favour 
of more specific, grounded and transparent methods’ 
1 www.landmatrix.org
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Figure 1: Numbers of land deals under negotiation or concluded in all African countries
Figure 2: Total hectares under negotiation and confirmed through contracts or leases

























































































































































































Source: derived from Land Matrix 2014 www.landmatrix.org (author’s calculations) 
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(see also Locher and Sulle 2013). The numbers, such 
as provided by the Land Matrix, provide a compelling 
indication of a dramatic phenomenon. But ultimately, 
aggregating hectares tells us very little, about the 
land and the people or the companies involved, and, 
therefore, the kinds of changes underway in social 
relations, ecosystems and economic systems. Water 
availability, now and in the future, is a key and a largely 
invisible, variable differentiating the deals. This means 
that the relatively small concessions in the DRC, 
gabon, Congo, Mozambique and parts of South Sudan 
– some of which are for logging indigenous forests – 
may be of greater value than more extensive leases in 
other countries.
The second phase of the land grab debate focused 
on understanding processes of acquisition and the 
impacts of land grabs at the local level. This period saw 
the emergence of a vast literature of case studies and 
comparative studies depicting local stories, struggles 
and outcomes, with attention being given to national 
political economies and legal and policy frameworks. 
This rich body of knowledge addresses diverse 
questions and, while it is of variable quality (Edelman, 
2013; oya, 2013a; Scoones et al., 2013), has thrown 
up many questions concerning the need to secure rights 
while also attracting investment. This extensive empirical 
research has drawn into question the assumptions 
underpinning African governments’ support for many 
such deals, namely that allocating large tracts of land 
to foreign companies will bring about economic growth 
and structural transformation of the economy (AU et 
al., 2013). The academic research literature has almost 
universally disproved this claim in relation to specific 
case studies (Deininger and Byerlee, 2011; White et al., 
20122; among many others).
Contrary to the common perception that big land deals 
involve large populations being displaced from their 
land, research has also drawn attention to the differential 
ways in which people are either excluded from, included 
in and benefit from, or are adversely incorporated 
(Smalley et al., 2014 on sugar outgrowers in Tanzania). 
Large-scale land deals may involve compensation and 
the offer of jobs for some (often men), while women’s 
access to water, forest resources and other common 
property may be lost without compensation (Englert and 
Daley, 2008; Tsikata and Yaro, 2014). Those with capital 
may be able to take advantage of new commercial 
activity in their area by investing in enterprises in the 
non-farm economy to generate new streams of income. 
Young people might be excluded from participation 
in the rural economy through loss of land – the failure 
of intergenerational transfer – or may establish new 
livelihoods within new farm investments or in related 
value chains (Hakizimana, 2014).
A recent comparative study undertaken by the Un 
Conference on Trade and Development (UnCTAD) 
together with the World Bank, addressed the 
performance of such investments and impacts on local 
communities (UnCTAD and World Bank, 2014). This 
review of 39 ‘mature’ agricultural investments in Africa 
and Southeast Asia debunks, rather devastatingly, the 
view that land-based investments that lead to land loss 
for local people can be justified on the basis of overall 
job creation and higher incomes. Job creation was one 
of the main expected benefits from these investments. 
Indeed, about 40,000 jobs were created by these 39 
investments. However, the number of jobs fell far short 
of projected employment creation, with, on average, 
just one job per 20 hectares. of these, about half were 
temporary, casual or seasonal, and just under 50 per 
cent were permanent jobs. More rarely in evidence 
were benefits in the form of technology transfer to local 
farmers, another priority reason for advancing large-
scale investments. At the same time, local residents 
and stakeholders regularly cited loss of access to land 
and water as negative effects of these investments 
(UnCTAD and World Bank, 2014: p. xiii). Investments 
that avoid land acquisition and focus on value-chain 
participation were deemed more successful in avoiding 
resource-based conflicts. Here the main challenges 
were access to finance for local farmers and other 
value-chain actors (UnCTAD and World Bank, 2014: p. 
xiv). Unsurprisingly, conflicts over land were more severe 
in cases where investors were using only a portion of 
the land they had acquired. Corroborating other studies 
(AU et al., 2014), this one found that land loss ranked as 
the biggest negative impact of land-based investments, 
challenging the optimistic view (World Bank, 2009: p. 
xvi) that land-based investments would take advantage 
of idle land or wasteland.
The third phase of the land grab debate has seen 
growing questioning of the phenomenon, its meaning 
and relationship to wider transformations in a globalising 
world. Many of the mooted mega-deals were never 
concluded (Land Policy Initiative 2014). Some that 
were concluded were not implemented. Many of those 
that were implemented only produced on a fraction 
of the land acquired and at the scale promised and 
some of these, in turn, collapsed as investors withdrew 
for a variety of reasons. Perhaps the ‘land grab’ is not 
so big after all. Perhaps it was a temporary blip. To 
what degree is the current pattern distinct from prior 
enclosures? What is being ‘grabbed’ and how do we 
know it has been grabbed? While some of the literature 
has questioned the methods used for understanding 
land deals and the categories involved (Scoones et al., 
2013), others have emphasised the diversity of forms of 
land grab, pointing to more incremental and long-term 
processes of change – concentration of ownership 
and accumulation of wealth – which challenge the ‘land 
grab’ label (kaag and Zoomers, 2014).
IIED WorkIng papEr




the single ‘land grab’ 
narrative
As the master narrative of the ‘land grab’ – or, more 
broadly, the ‘resource grab’ – was interrogated through 
extensive field-based research across many African 
countries, new realities emerged which challenged the 
linear suggestions of a ‘grab’. Reality subverts each 
element of this neat storyline. As the process unfolds 
and our understanding deepens, the single narrative of 
the ‘land grab’ fractures into multiple messy elements. 
new perspectives have emerged that reinforce the 
view that such a grab is underway, yet complicate our 
understanding of who is doing this, why, how, where 
and with what results. Five such themes relate to the 
resources being lost or acquired:
• Whether the ‘land grab’ in fact constitutes a ‘water 
grab’
• The significance of domestic and small-scale 
acquisitions in comparison to foreign acquisitions
• The growing social and economic differentiation being 
driven by these investments, as some people benefit 
and others lose out
• The financialisation of agriculture and entry of new 
financial sector actors seeking to convert natural 
resources into financial commodities for trade 
and profit
• The relationship between resource grabs and market 
expansion by corporations involved in the food system 
upstream and downstream from primary production.
In the diversity of all these situations, the resource grab 
needs to be understood as highly fractured, with diverse 
drivers, actors, interests and outcomes.
From land grab to water 
grab
First, not only land is being grabbed. Mehta et al., 
(2012) have pointed out that while ‘land grabs’ have 
captured the headlines, the interconnectedness of land 
and water in farming systems means that water is also 
being grabbed. Yet ‘water grabs’ are more complex to 
understand and to quantify: ‘the fluid nature of water 
and its hydrologic complexity often obscure how water 
grabbing takes place and what the associated impacts 
on the environment and diverse social groups are’ 
(Mehta et al., 2012: p. xx). Much of Africa’s land may 
well be under-utilised compared to its potential, as the 
World Bank (2009, see also Deininger and Byerlee 
2011) and its land use modellers (Fischer and Shah, 
2010) remind us. Yet the land sought and acquired by 
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investors is usually precisely that which is most prized by 
local farmers: fertile land with good rainfall or irrigation 
potential, close to urban centres and close to transport 
networks (oxfam, 2011). As gRAIn (2012) observed 
in its report on water grabs, aptly titled Squeezing 
Africa Dry:
‘Those who have been buying up vast areas 
of farmland in recent years, whether they are 
based in Addis Ababa, Dubai or London, 
realise that the access to water they gain, often 
included for free or without restriction, may 
well be worth more in the long term than the 
land deals themselves.’ (GRAIN, 2012)
Rights to water are seldom explicit, but are almost 
always implied in land deals. ‘Stabilisation’ clauses in 
contracts between African states and private investors 
prohibit states from taking actions that may impede 
the profitable operation of private enterprises for the 
duration of long-term leases, and entitle lessees to 
water take-off from rivers and catchments (Smaller and 
Mann, 2009; Cotula, 2011). Such stabilisation clauses 
‘commit governments to not alter regulatory frameworks 
in a way that undermines the economic viability of the 
investment’ (Howse, 2011). In this way they constrain 
the policy autonomy of host countries and expose them 
to the risk of being sued in international investment 
tribunals should they institute measures that jeopardise 
the profitability of international investments – even if 
such measures are essential for the well-being and 
resource access of their own citizens (Cotula, 2011). 
This is indeed a diluting of national sovereignty (Sassen, 
2013). While such clauses are standard requirements 
presented by investors in negotiations with national 
governments, the African Union and FAo guidelines 
on land-based investments have paid little attention 
to them.
So are land deals driving water grabs? gRAIn (2012) 
and Mehta et al. (2012) argue the opposite, that access 
to water is what is driving land deals. Indeed, demand 
for large areas of farmland is directly correlated with the 
availability of water for rainfed and irrigated production. 
The absence of any major transnational land deals in 
namibia, for instance, reflects this (Land Matrix, 2014). 
other factors shaping the demand for land and water 
in Africa include urban and industrial expansion, the 
growing number of major hydropower projects (in DRC, 
Ethiopia, namibia, and Mozambique) and other non-farm 
projects cashing in on the growth of the African middle 
class and Africa as a destination market for leisure 
and tourism. Land deals involve the transfer not only of 
water rights, but also access to forests. As Sulle and 
nelson (2014) have observed in Tanzania, clear-cutting 
of indigenous hardwood forests has proved a highly 
profitable sideline for biofuels investors and could even 
constitute the primary business motivation behind such 
investments, not least as several biofuels investments 
have failed to materialise. In the case of the Bioshape 
investment at kilwa, on Tanzania’s coastal belt, the exit 
of a biofuels investor after just two years, having clear-
cut the indigenous forest. This has left communities 
dispossessed of their land and forests, and without the 
feasible option of returning to either, as the land remains 
subject to a 98-year lease and the forest no longer 
exists (Sulle and nelson, 2014).
Attempts to quantify the extent of the water being 
grabbed and to forecast the implications for the 
future have foundered on a critical lack of robust data. 
one attempt by Rulli et al. (2013) to put numbers to 
the ‘water grab’, gathered data on grabbed land in 
62 countries to evaluate the ‘virtual water’ transfer 
involved in food and biofuel transferred from grabbed to 
grabbing countries. Using FAo data on agro-ecological 
zones and time series data on rainfall and weather 
conditions, they generated scenarios for rainfed ‘green 
water’ farming and irrigated ‘blue water’ farming in order 
to estimate the re-allocation of water that forms part 
of land deals. Their data suggest that Indonesia is the 
most water-grabbed country, followed by Sudan and 
Tanzania. Looking at water per unit area, Cameroon, 
Papua new guinea and Tanzania are the biggest 
targets for ‘water grabs’. The water is not only diverted 
to new uses and users, but in many cases exported 
as ‘virtual water’ in the form of commodities – as food, 
biofuels and other crops – to distant markets (Allan et 
al., 2012). But Rulli et al. (2013) have been criticised 
for their claims of scientific rigour and publication of 
precise figures, all of which rest on data that is known 
to be incorrect (see for instance Scoones et al., 2013, 
reply by Rulli et al., 2013 and rebuttal by Scoones 
et al., 2013).
A continuum: from foreign 
corporations to domestic 
elites
Second, pressures on land are multiple, arising not only 
from multinational corporations looking for new sites 
for offshore production, but also from domestic actors. 
From experiences in Zambia, kenya, Mozambique 
and elsewhere, we now understand that there is a 
continuum of grabs underway, ranging from urban 
migrants using their wage incomes to acquire or extend 
their landholdings in their rural home villages, to urban 
businesspeople. Foreign companies seeking large tracts 
of land in Africa may not be the most significant form of 
resource grab underway. Deininger et al. (2011) show 
that in certain countries, including nigeria and Sudan, 
the total area acquired by domestic investors exceeds 
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that acquired by foreigners. Further, several studies 
suggest that, cumulatively, smaller localised grabs by 
domestic elites may constitute a more pervasive and 
significant force transforming agrarian economies than 
large-scale land grabs (Jayne et al., 2014).
Such findings suggest that attention to large-scale 
land deals has obscured this. or to what degree is 
land grabbing taking place within communities and 
even households, in response to growing pressure on 
land? This cannot be equated with the large corporate 
takeovers of community land with official sanction. 
But it does suggest that growing pressure on, and 
demand for, land sparks processes of accumulation and 
concentration at multiple levels. Serwajja (2014) shows 
this in relation to post-conflict northern Uganda. Smalley 
et al. (2014) show it in relation to sugar outgrowing 
and its impacts on food production and land conflicts 
in central Tanzania. Lind and Letai (2010) show how 
this was the case also in the pastoral drylands of 
Laikipia in kenya’s Rift Valley. In each case, large-scale 
investments have involved some displacement of local 
settlements or, more commonly, cropping or grazing 
land. But their impact is far greater than this direct 
displacement, as the enclosure of large concessions 
had sparked growing competition over land, not only 
among the existing population, but also with urban 
elites and others with capital. Such localised processes 
of land grabbing, set within the wider context of large 
acquisitions, have been documented for the great 
Lakes region by Ansoms et al. (2014). They have also 
been observed more generally in an analysis for sub-
Saharan Africa as a whole by Jayne et al. (2014). 
From the dispossessed 
to the beneficiaries of 
land grabs
Third, not all rural Africans are negatively affected by 
‘land grabs’. Research has shown the central role 
being played by local intermediaries and supporters 
of ambitious ‘development’ projects that would see 
external capital injected into poverty-stricken regions 
(Ariyo and Mortimore, 2012). These include district 
commissioners and traditional authorities, and also, 
within already-differentiated rural communities, those 
with more land to transact and with prospects of being 
incorporated into commercial joint ventures. Most of 
these are men (Tsikata and Yaro, 2014). This suggests 
not only that land grabs precipitate new patterns 
of accumulation, but also that where commercial 
investments precipitate profound changes in local 
economies, local people are differentially incorporated 
into new production systems. In other words, new class 
structures emerge, usually involving stark differentiation 
between owners of land and capital, on the one hand, 
and sellers of labour on the other or, more worryingly, 
those unable to sell their labour – the surplus population 
(Li, 2011). These new agrarian settings create new 
labour regimes, with some farmers becoming workers 
and others being made redundant or moving to the 
cities, producing a phenomenon that Bernstein (2010) 
calls ‘fragmented classes of labour’. Differentiation 
among ‘host’ communities emerges not only along the 
lines of class, but also gender, generation and ethnicity. 
So while new investments might bring scarcity for those 
who lose their land, water and other natural resources, 
these land deals redistribute scarcity at multiple scales, 
enabling accumulation among some local actors as 
well as investors and national governments (White 
et al., 2012).
gender is one way of understanding the stark divide 
between the rights-based discourses that animate the 
African Union’s agencies, and how state authorities 
actually behave. At the Agricultural Investment, gender 
and Land in Africa conference in 2014, the director 
of Uganda’s national investment authority conceded 
that when investors approach rural communities, they 
want to speak to rights holders and under Ugandan 
customs only men are rights holders. He admitted 
that in boardrooms, when state institutions negotiate 
with investors, gender equality and the impacts of 
investment on women were not even part of the agenda 
Investors did not see that gender equality was relevant 
to their commercial goals and the government did 
not pressure them to do so. Contrary to two African 
Union and two FAo regulatory frameworks, then, this 
authority as the main interface between investors and a 
national government did not register any need to secure 
women’s rights to land or ensure that foreign investors 
recognise or respect such rights. While wealthier men, 
in particular, might benefit, the impacts of land deals on 
women have been scarcely addressed.
Financialisation: from land 
for production to land as a 
financial commodity
Fourth, land and water are being acquired not merely 
for their productive use, but also for their speculative 
value as financial commodities, now and into a future 
rendered even more uncertain in a context of climate 
change. Financialisation involves converting the natural 
resources that underpin rural people’s livelihoods 
into financial investment products. As Clapp (2014) 
observes, while commodity markets and exchanges are 
nothing new, the process of ‘financialisation’ unfolding 
in Africa and elsewhere brings new actors in and around 
the commodity chain. They are taking bets and making 
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profits as food and the land and water with which it can 
be produced are abstracted from their physical form into 
a financial instrument, with the expectation of growth in 
derivative markets (Sassen, 2010). This allows financial 
actors to externalize costs, avoid responsibility, and 
portray financialisation as the answer to, rather than the 
cause of, problems in the food system (Clapp, 2014). 
Yet little is known about the ways in which these new 
actors operate in Africa. And little is known about the 
extent to which, even where production is underway, 
their acquisition of land and water is speculative; they 
are betting on the growing value of fertile land with 
available water. The values of such ‘fictive commodities’ 
fluctuate not on the basis of production or productivity, 
but based on perceptions and expectations in a 
global marketplace.
Upstream and downstream 
from the farm: from land 
grabs to value chain grabs
The context for the land rush in Africa, and why certain 
countries and regions are targeted, is also the source 
of ongoing debate. Those who are optimistic that this 
new investor interest can be channelled in support 
of agricultural development have emphasised the 
opportunities for intensification of production and the 
potential contribution of Africa to meeting rising global 
demand for food, feed and fuel. This perspective 
emphasises how Africa is distinct from other developing 
regions, offering particular opportunities for investment 
and agricultural intensification because of a relatively 
low population to land ratio (World Bank, 2009) and 
‘yield gaps’ between productive potential and current 
output (Deininger and Byerlee, 2011). What is more, 
unlike Southeast Asia and Latin America, where 
more than half the investment capital in agriculture 
comes from within the region, Africa has a low internal 
investment ratio (UnCTAD, 2014). These contextual 
factors justify arguments that Africa depends largely 
on luring external private capital to drive agricultural 
commercialisation (new Alliance, 2014). This argument, 
though, tends to obscure the fact that while intra-African 
investment is low, it is rising rapidly, driven by private 
companies from the regional powerhouses of nigeria, 
kenya and South Africa, each of which has doubled 
its share of investment in Africa between the periods 
2003–2008 to 2009–2013 (UnCTAD, 2014: pp. 
38–41). Africa is not only a destination, but a source of 
major capital investment.
A further complexity in the land grab debate is that 
many foreign investors seeking to profit from Africa’s 
capacity to grow and consume food are not actually 
primarily interested in land. Primary production in 
agriculture is a risky proposition under most conditions 
and, with increasingly formalised value chains, is 
not where most profits are to be reaped (Bernstein, 
2013). Land may not be that important to agribusiness 
and other investors. They are more concerned about 
controlling what is done on it and how this can secure 
new markets for seed companies and producers of 
pesticides, fertilisers, tractors and other equipment. 
They are also concerned about securing the supply for 
agroprocessors who will produce commodities to be 
retailed across the continent. Alongside land grabs, 
we are witnessing a trend of ‘supermarketisation’ and 
a ‘retail tidal wave of FDI’ (foreign direct investment) 
directed towards developing countries across the globe 
and particularly in Africa (Weatherspoon and Reardon, 
2003). Many African countries are ‘supermarketising’, a 
pattern already clearly evident in, for instance, the march 
of the South African supermarket giant Shoprite, now in 
more than half of all African countries.
As supermarkets enter new developing markets, 
Reardon and gulati (2008) observe, their initial 
offerings centre on manufactured and processed 
foods with long shelf lives, but over time they seek to 
promote fresh foods – fruit, vegetables, dairy and meat. 
To do so, they establish centralised and formalised 
procurement systems and impose quality and quantity 
requirements that exclude small-scale farmers from 
supply chains. They require instead production at a 
scale which necessitates mono-cropping and uniform 
farm produce. In this context, it is not land grabs, but 
rather the pull of retail, that drives large-scale industrial 
agriculture. Also suited to producing for such markets 
are contract farming arrangements involving smallholder 
outgrowers of sugar, tea, cotton, coffee and other 
major cash commodities (Little and Watts, 1994; 
Smalley, 2013; oya, 2013b). As retail demands supply 
from smallholders, the new wave of contract farming 
seems to be replicating many of the problems of prior 
experiments. These include displacement of food crops 
(and women’s control over land and food), price volatility 
and over-production relative to processing capacity 
(Sulle et al., 2014, Smalley et al., 2014).
To understand the ‘resource grab’ requires 
understanding the changes in investment and control of 
the food system upstream and downstream from primary 
production. Two elements merit particular attention. First 
is the liberalisation of seed markets and multinational 
corporations’ interests, including their takeovers of 
seed companies within and for the African market 
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(ACB, 2014). The United States company DuPont’s 
merger and majority stake in Pannar, the South African 
seed company, is aimed at conducting research and 
development in a ‘hub in South Africa to develop new 
seed technology for the region’ (UnCTAD, 2014: p. 37). 
At the same time, at the other end of the value chain is a 
rapidly expanding consumer market for mass-produced 
and processed food.
‘Africa has the fastest-growing middle 
class in the world: according to the African 
Development Bank, the continent’s middle 
class numbers about 120 million now and will 
grow to 1.1 billion by 2060. Wal-Mart plans 
to open 90 new stores across sub-Saharan 
Africa over the next three years, as it targets 
growth markets such as Nigeria and Angola.’ 
(UNCTAD, 2014: p. 17)
on reflection, the initial representations of the ‘land 
grab’ in Africa as being an annexation of natural 
resources by foreign powers to serve their own markets 
appears inadequate to describe the range of interests 
involved. This is not a repeat of the first scramble for 
Africa in the late nineteenth century. The grab of natural 
resources is in part an attempt to address consumption 
needs in other regions of the world, but it is also 
driven by speculative opportunities for profits from the 
rising values of farmland and water, and from growing 
consumer markets within Africa itself.
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4 
From land grab to 
land governance
It is now widely accepted that ‘investments’ in Africa in 
recent years have amounted to a resource grab, rather 
than a ‘win-win’ arrangement for all parties. When this 
began can be traced to the explosion of research and 
media reports between 2009 and 2011, including 
reports by the World Bank (Deininger and Byerlee, 
2011) and the FAo High-level Panel of Experts on Food 
Security and nutrition (CFS, 2011). These influential 
reports presented damning evidence of the negative 
impacts of large-scale land leasing and concessions, 
giving mainstream credibility to the charge that ‘land 
grabs’ were underway. But this quickly gave way to a 
multiplicity of initiatives driven by northern governments, 
development agencies and financial institutions – and 
even corporate investors themselves – to regulate the 
resource grab rather than to stop or reverse it. In other 
words, they addressed how to improve the governance 
of transactions without challenging the direction 
of change in who controls resources. Premised 
on narratives of global scarcity and the compelling 
argument that Africa urgently needed private investment 
in agriculture to feed itself and the world (Scoones et al., 
2014), such initiatives have shifted the terrain of debate 
away from how to stop the resource grab. Instead, they 
focus on how to promote land-based investments in a 
responsible manner and to regulate how land, water 
and other natural resources are transacted and rights 
transferred from existing users to new ones.
key initiatives to regulate large-scale land deals include 
the African Union’s Framework and guidelines on 
land policy in Africa (AU et al., 2009). This provides 
broad principles to inform national policymaking, and 
warned of a ‘second scramble for Africa’. next came 
the Principles for responsible agricultural investment 
that respect rights, livelihoods and resources (PRAI) 
(FAo et al. 2010) sponsored by the World Bank, 
FAo, International Fund for Agricultural Development 
(IFAD) and UnCTAD. This set out seven principles with 
which investors would be expected to comply. More 
far-reaching was the FAo Voluntary guidelines for the 
responsible governance of tenure of land, fisheries and 
forests in the context of national food security (VggT) 
(FAo, 2012). This referenced binding international 
law and covenants, while setting out the obligations 
of both states and private investors. The African 
Union’s Guiding principles on large scale land based 
investments in Africa (AU et al., 2014), built on its earlier 
Framework and guidelines and establishing specific 
commitments by national states, was signed by Heads 
of State in April 2014. And most recently, the FAo 
Committee on World Food Security’s Principles for 
responsible investment in agriculture and food systems 
(CFS-rai) (FAo, 2014) developed the principles 
proposed by the World Bank and others, but now linked 
these to the VggT and used multilateral processes 
through the Un to get government buy-in.
The assumption underpinning all these guidelines is 
that land governance must be strengthened. Some of 
the frameworks assume that ‘development’ requires 
that poor people give up their land – subject to 
compensation, and with some prospect of getting 
employment in new enterprises. Ideally, also, it is 
necessary to make sure that poor and vulnerable 
people do not lose out on growth and are adequately 
compensated for losing access to land and other natural 
resources. In this way, specifically in the PRAI, rights 
to natural resources have been subordinated to what is 
presented as the ‘greater good’ – capital inflow, rising 
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output, growth in employment (even at the expense of 
self-employment) and prospects for foreign exchange 
earnings. International financial institutions have argued 
that concerns over land access may matter less if 
jobs are being created and if people are able to earn 
higher incomes – a view also promoted by the investors 
themselves and deployed by financiers, development 
agencies and African political leaders (UnCTAD and 
World Bank, 2014). 
While the ‘land grab’ critique was initially successful, the 
critics within Africa have been somewhat wrong-footed 
as the terrain has been re-defined. now, many African 
governments are discussing how to facilitate the transfer 
of resource rights in the interests of development, if only 
poor people would rescind their claims to land, water, 
forests and other resources. These policy narratives 
in Africa are clearly evident in statements by African 
political and industry leaders. When private companies 
acquire large areas of African land previously held and 
used by local people, some call this investment and 
development while others call these resource grabs 
that strip Africans of the precious natural resources that 
they rely on for their livelihoods. African governments 
increasingly straddle these perspectives, invoking 
nationalist arguments while at the same time conceding 
that their own citizens will need to be dispossessed 
in the name of development. The first two African 
Union Guiding Principles demonstrate this tension 
by embracing a defence of property rights and, at the 
same time, defining property rights in terms of a right to 
compensation for dispossession.
‘Principle 1: LSLBI [large-scale land-based 
investments] respect the existing, customarily-
defined rights of local people and communities 
to land and land-related resources. 
Principle 2: Persons who lose access to or 
ownership of land and land-related resources 
and benefits due to LSLBI are awarded 
compensation that is fair and timely, in 
compliance with existing national laws and 
relevant international instruments.’ (AU et al., 
2014: p. 1)
What is controversial about large land deals is precisely 
that authorities transact the land rights protected in 
principle one, without free, prior and informed consent 
by customary rights holders – a practice which requires 
their compensation as in principle two. Indeed, Africa 
is the centre of ‘land grabbing’ not because the land 
is under-utilised (a justification rather than a cause 
of large-scale land deals), but rather because the 
entitlements of those who occupy, use or lay claim to it 
are routinely ignored in established legal codes (Alden 
Wily, 2012). Land grabs may often be legal, at least 
under national law, but this may not mean that they are 
fair or comply with human rights standards (kaag and 
Zoomers, 2014).
The g8’s Land Transparency Initiative (LTI) is the main 
avenue through which g8 countries seek to address 
problems of land and other resource grabs. Building 
on precursors in the extractives industry, advocates 
of the LTI argue that an independent monitoring 
mechanism would ensure that land and other resource 
transactions are subject to public scrutiny by bringing 
together multiple stakeholders at the national level to 
oversee all major land deals. Civil society organisations, 
though, have objected that transparency will not stop 
land grabs, that the g8 has no democratic legitimacy 
to make decisions about land, food and nutrition, and 
that the transparency initiative would undermine the 
multilateral agreement forged by the CFS and embodied 
in the FAo voluntary guidelines (TnI, 2013). Such 
critics charge that the LTI would promote an alternative 
and parallel system to the FAo voluntary guidelines and 
would separate initiatives to improve land governance 
in Africa from the global rights framework (FIAn 2013). 
The critics also contend that it constitutes a means of 
promoting transnational land investments rather than 
halting them (TnI, 2013). Despite scoping work to learn 
from prior transparency initiatives (Locke and Henley, 
2013), the LTI has, in practice, remained as a set of 
proposals not yet put into operation.
opaque negotiations determine the contracts between 
governments and investors. The terms of these 
contracts include the precise area to be acquired, the 
uses to which the land and other resources can be put, 
the amount of rent or compensation payable and to 
whom this should be paid. As Cotula (2011) observes, 
‘negotiations usually happen behind closed doors’ and 
the outcomes of the negotiations, as embodied in the 
contracts, are usually not exposed to public scrutiny 
or even made available to people who will be directly 
affected by the deals. The one exception in Africa is 
Liberia, where the national parliament is required to 
ratify any large-scale land investment and to publish 
the contract (Cotula, 2011). However, this may not 
necessarily constrain governments from allocating large 
tracts of land, as is evidenced by the Land Matrix’s 
data showing that Liberia has leased out the largest 
area of all African countries, relative to its size. Apart 
from the Liberian case, though, behind the closed 
negotiating doors is a toxic combination of limited 
negotiating capacity to drive enforceable commitments 
from investors and equitable distributions of benefits. 
Also it is alleged that there is widespread corruption in 
which political leaders, ruling parties and negotiating 
authorities solicit or receive cash payments or other 
forms of kickbacks.
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Back to large-scale 
private investments: 
the New Alliance
Along with the efforts to improve land governance there 
has been a renewed effort to entice private investors 
into African agriculture. The new Alliance on food 
security and nutrition, launched 18 May 2012 during 
the g8 Summit in Washington (White House 2012), 
sought to ‘accelerate responsible investment in African 
agriculture and lift 50 million people out of poverty by 
2022’ (Mckeon, 2014). This saw six African countries 
– later expanded to ten – agreeing to implement 
concessionary reforms to encourage multinational 
corporations to invest in their farming sectors. They 
were Benin, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, ghana, Côte 
d’Ivoire, Malawi, Mozambique, nigeria, Senegal and 
Tanzania. In this way, the world’s wealthiest nations, who 
had pledged $22 billion in budget support to countries 
with plans to tackle hunger, redirected their energies 
to getting African states to make concessions for 45 
multinational corporations in return for a projected $3 
billion in corporate FDI – a new round of self-imposed 
and g8-supervised structural adjustment (Forum on 
Environment and Development 2013).
The new Alliance agenda consists of a wide range of 
policy reforms to address corporate investors’ interests, 
particularly in the area of seed control and seed 
markets. This would include governments stopping the 
distribution of seed to farmers, except in emergencies, 
so as to secure markets for seed companies (Provost, 
2014). other reforms include ending export bans, 
for example when Malawi conceded to abandoning 
all export restrictions except for maize, so as to allow 
companies to export food crops, even in times of food 
shortages within the country (Provost, 2014). This 
represents an abrupt break from the g8 commitment in 
2010 to pledge $22 billion to poor countries that had 
goods plans to tackle hunger. Rather, the new Alliance 
represents recognition that public sector funding 
and strategies are not the defining factors in African 
agriculture. Much of the future use of natural resources, 
food production and food provisioning will be left to the 
private sector, or ‘the market’ – specifically a restricted 
number of multinational companies with the backing 
of the g8, a variety of bilateral donors and private 
‘philanthrocapitalist’ foundations.
At the outset, farmer and civil society organisations 
responded to the new Alliance with deep mistrust, 
seeing it as a case of African states pursuing a path of 
commercialisation by siding with foreign capital against 
the interests of existing farmers (Holt-gimenez 2012, 
oxfam 2012, War on Want 2012). This joint statement 
by 15 African peasant organisations challenges the 
underlying premise of the new Alliance that states need 
to facilitate private investment from abroad rather than 
directly supporting their own farmers:
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‘Today we are faced with two contrasting 
aspirations in Sub-Saharan Africa: the desire 
to regain control of our development and, 
on the other hand, the temptation of an 
excessive reliance on external resources... 
[African governments] should accord the 
major advantages to the principal investors 
in agriculture, those who take the risks within 
the family enterprises, that is, the peasants, 
and not to urban or foreign sources of capital.’ 
(ACB et al., 2013)
To appreciate this moment fully in a historical 
perspective, one needs to trace a complex policy 
trajectory over the past 50 years at least. Among many 
African states, this trajectory saw the rise of state-
driven developmentalism in the early independence 
era. This first involved substantial state investment in 
agriculture and supportive institutions. Then it passed 
through the debt crisis and structural adjustment in the 
1980s and progressed to the stagnation of agricultural 
development in the 1980s and 1990s. During this 
latter period the expected growth in private investment 
in the liberalised sector failed to materialise. now it 
has progressed to a revived global investor interest 
in Africa’s land and water. Unlike the first ‘scramble 
for Africa’ in the nineteenth century, though, Africa is 
now not only the source of raw materials, but a market 
for primary and value-added products. This suggests 
that the simplistic parallels drawn between the current 
land rush and its precursors need to be nuanced, in 
appreciation of the growing disparities and patterns of 
accumulation that are marked by an expanding middle 
class and urban consumer sector.
In this context, models of agricultural development 
and ‘modernisation’ have been imported. While the 
new Alliance sees multinational corporations gaining 
preferential access to African markets through policy 
concessions supported by g8 countries, several 
new actors are influencing agricultural development 
trajectories in Africa. Recent years have seen the 
emergence of new development partners, along with 
the importation of agricultural development models from 
Brazil, China and, to a lesser degree, India and South 
Africa. While the role of China in African agriculture 
has often been overplayed and caricatured (Brautigam, 
2011), Chinese companies and parastatals continue 
to be significant as sources of finance and have 
become key players in the forestry sector, especially 
through large logging contracts in countries like gabon 
and Mozambique (Mckenzie, 2006, 2009, Jansson 
et al., 2009).
Another significant actor in African farming in recent 
years is Brazil. Brazilian expertise has been introduced 
in ten countries in Africa, as African states seek to learn 
from the Cerrado model of agricultural colonisation 
and to elaborate technical capacity for large-scale 
crop farming and production of biofuels, especially 
by refining sugar into ethanol, as in Zimbabwe. To 
provide support, the parastatal agricultural research 
agency Empresa Brasileira de Pesquisa Agropecuária 
(Embrapa) (Brazilian Corporation of Agricultural 
Research) established several centres in Africa, 
starting in ghana and Mozambique (ABC 2011). 
As well as exporting technical expertise and agro-
industrial equipment, Brazil is also exporting a model of 
development based on state-driven cadres of extension 
officers promoting large-scale agro-industry. nowhere 
is this more apparent than in Mozambique, the main 
focus of Brazil’s African investment. Here colonial 
histories and agro-ecological similarities (at least as 
perceived by the World Bank, 2009) combine to forge 
contemporary partnerships to modernise Mozambican 
agriculture in 14 districts that constitute the nacala 
corridor (Cabral 2013, Chichava et al., 2013). Building 
on the Japan-Brazil co-operation programme for 
development of the Cerrado, which dates back to 1978, 
the ProSAVAnA programme explicitly seeks to emulate 
that model of expanding industrial-scale agriculture 
(ProSAVAnA, 2014, nampula, 2014). Local farmer 
organisations, though, decry ProSAVAnA as a means 
of dispossessing them of their land and establishing 
estate farms to supply global markets via the port at 
nacala. The farmer organisations argue that the focus 
on industrial farming will threaten existing farmers, 
turning them either into wage workers or into a surplus 
population excluded from new systems of production 
(UnAC, 2012). They have called instead for the funds 
dedicated to ProSAVAnA to be redirected to the 
existing Mozambican government programme for family 
farmers (UnAC, 2012; nampula, 2014).
Emerging from the new Alliance, then, and from 
Brazilian and Chinese partnerships are mega-
projects focusing on ‘corridor’ development (Paul 
and Steinbrecher 2013). one such example is the 
ProSAVAnA project in northern Mozambique, where 
farmers face displacement from their lands in favour of 
multinational plans for large-scale production structures 
for export. Though initiated in 2012, ProSAVAnA 
has made little headway amid resistance from local 
farmer associations and international bad press. It is 
now focused on several small pilot projects instead 
of the grand plans of a 14 million hectare corridor 
for agricultural commercialisation (UnAC, 2012). 
In Tanzania, too, the new Alliance has provided the 
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justification for major investments through a growth 
corridor – the Southern agricultural growth corridor 
of Tanzania (SAgCoT). This constitutes nearly one 
third of the country. Here again, contrary to the new 
Alliance commitment to support local small-scale 
farmers, the government has earmarked large tracts, 
amounting to tens of thousands of hectares, to be made 
available on tender to international private investors 
(Sulle and Hall, 2013). These high-level public–private 
partnerships, forged in the name of the new Alliance, 
entail concessionary provisions for private capital, a 
stance which critics have characterised as ‘national 
states are backing out from active policy making’ 
(Working group, 2013, emphasis in the original). 
This raises profound questions as to where the locus 
of decision-making is on the allocation of Africa’s 
natural resources and what the implications are for 
African citizens, and farmers in particular, who seek to 
influence policy.
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The ‘land grab’ in Africa raises profound questions 
about governance more generally, and the relationships 
between citizens, governments and private capital. Who 
is calling the shots and what are the real politics?
The core challenge that now faces national governments 
in Africa is how to square land governance reforms with 
investment strategies. Already some improvements 
are evident, such as the Zambian land policy process 
(in limbo for more than a decade) being revived with 
the aim of confirming a national land policy to protect 
customary and informal tenure. More generally, though, 
African policy makers and parliamentarians are candid 
that the combination of self-interest by political parties 
and individuals, and national growth strategies mitigate 
against realising the visions of land tenure security in 
the FAo and African Union guidelines that they have 
signed up to (SADC Parliamentarian Forum, 2014). 
Parliamentarians across the continent have agreed that 
the land and resource grab must be stopped, and that 
national governments must put in place adequate legal 
and institutional frameworks to protect existing land 
and tenure rights. The Pan African Parliament, and its 
regional bodies representing national parliaments, have 
committed themselves to ‘work for the development of 
legal frameworks. These frameworks, while attracting 
investment, ensure the preservation of ecosystems 
and sustainable development, taking into account local 
conditions and the concerns of small-scale farmers, 
indigenous people and women’. Also the frameworks 
‘work towards transparency of all investment contracts 
and treaties, whether with local or foreign investors, 
by making them available to the public in a timely 
manner’ (SADC Parliamentary Forum, 2014). Yet these 
visions are yet to become evident in national laws 
and regulations. 
While some have warned of a ‘race to the bottom’ 
as African states compete to provide the most 
concessionary terms for multinational capital to enter 
into farming and agro-food value chains, the uptake of 
the new Alliance suggests a more cautious approach. 
Many countries are retaining protection for their markets, 
including bans on genetically-modified organisms. How 
these processes will unfold is not only hard to predict, 
but is also far from public scrutiny. The new Alliance is 
now the most powerful and well-resourced intervention 
in African agriculture, and farmers’ associations 
and social movements opposing corporate-led 
commercialisation have little insight into how these 
public–private deals are unfolding. Participation 
in national land observatories is one opening for 
activist organisations, but, if it is de-coupled from the 
substantive issue of the forms of agricultural investment 
and their effects, this ‘land governance’ agenda is very 
thin indeed.
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The plethora of international and regional guidelines, 
frameworks and declarations dedicated to stopping land 
grabs in Africa may well seem like the most plausible 
route for farmers’ organisations and other civil society 
groups challenging land and water grabs. But at the 
national level, such groups exert limited influence. So 
where should advocacy efforts focus: the Un system, 
international and donor institutions, the African Union, 
or national political processes? Experience to date 
suggests that all of these are forums where farmers’ 
organisations can have some influence, and while these 
remain important spheres of contestation, they remain 
limited. As African lobby groups seek to contest the 
land rush, and to hold governments to account, this 
may not be the only or even the key area of leverage. 
Local action backed up by international campaigns 
may well have greater impact on private sector players, 
themselves vulnerable to damage to their reputations 
at home and abroad. oxfam’s Behind the Brands 
campaign has shown how, by holding multinational 
beverage companies responsible for land grabs for 
sugar production, pressure can been exerted down the 
value chain to rein in the private sector.
Innovations, which could well become points of leverage 
to strengthen resource rights, include partnerships 
to register community rights to land that, while not 
resolving internal configurations of rights and claims, 
could serve to defend against state leasing. These could 
be combined with low-cost and participatory forms 
of mapping of existing land and other resource uses. 
Strengthening land rights from below provides a starting 
point. At the same time, for as long as land leasing 
continues, partnerships and alliances could potentially 
cohere in efforts to strengthen African governments’ 
negotiating skills to secure better contracts and leases, 
learning lessons from the laissez-faire terms of the 
recent land rush. Beyond these possibilities, though, is 
the more profound question of mounting alternatives to 
the corporate takeover not only of land and water, but of 
control over food value chains within Africa and globally. 
This requires vast intellectual and practical work, and 
alliances that can gain momentum across urban as 
well as rural Africa. In support of this, notions of land 
sovereignty and food sovereignty need to be better 
specified in theory and practice (Edelman et al., 2014).
In the midst of the debate about farmland investments 
there is an astonishing lack of attention to rural non-farm 
economies in the discourse surrounding agricultural 
commercialisation. The presumption of an ageing farm 
population and that young people want jobs rather than 
farm are problematic generalisations (Sumberg et al., 
2012). A core issue is whether or not large corporate 
land acquisitions will enable alternative livelihoods for 
people living in rural areas, especially for young people 
who may be locked out of farming livelihoods as family 
land is lost (Hakizimana, 2014). African governments 
need to grapple with this issue.
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Conclusions
The debate concerning the future of farming in Africa 
centres on the role of corporate agribusiness versus 
family farmers who farm and produce for themselves 
and for markets, and already, in large part, feed the 
continent. The debate often lapses into a polarised 
‘large versus small farm’ dichotomy. This raises the 
question of how to forge ‘inclusive business models’ 
that enable synergies between these sectors that have 
come to the forefront of debate across the continent. 
Those who raised the critique that a ‘land grab’ is 
underway in Africa won the fight, but, so far, they are 
losing the battle. The fight was to redefine large-scale 
acquisitions of land as a ‘grab’ that, while often legal 
under national statutes, violates international human 
rights norms and local people’s resource rights. 
But defining the alternative to dispossession and 
displacement has been far more complicated. now the 
centre of the debate among African states is how to 
regulate investments so as to produce inclusive paths of 
development that combine (foreign or domestic) private 
investment with local populations (Cotula and Leonard 
2010). But this debate is moving ahead in the absence 
of adequate safeguards being in place to defend the 
rights of the latter.
As argued so forthrightly by Alden Wily (2010) in her 
aptly titled paper, ‘Whose land are you giving away, Mr 
President?’, the dangerous dichotomy of interests (and 
asymmetry of power) that leads to resource grabs is not 
primarily between investors and rural Africans, but rather 
between rural Africans and their own governments. In 
view of this, the focus of regulatory initiatives over the 
past five years on large-scale investments and FDI, 
could be misplaced. This point is underscored further 
by evidence of the sheer scale of local-level land grabs, 
by rural elites, urban elites and state elites (Ansoms et 
al., 2014). It is also emphasised by the ways in which 
large-scale land acquisitions are interacting with and 
aggravating the heightened competition and conflict 
over land (Jayne et al., 2014). Regulating the entry of 
large foreign investments cannot in any way substitute 
for more generalised legal and institutional measures to 
secure informal and customary rights to land and water, 
and, more generally, to natural resources as common 
property. Yet precisely at a time when investors, 
both foreign and local, seek to gain control of such 
resources, it is only through political struggle that the 
existing claims of resource users might be recognised 
as constituting real property rights. Such struggles may 
be strengthened when located within broader social 
movements mobilising for economic justice and for the 
democratisation of political space. Alliances between 
rural and urban movements could be definitive.
Securing resource rights through national legislation 
and realising these in practice through accessible and 
accountable institutions are the steps needed to give 
African farmers, most of whom are women, the basis 
for their own development. But as we have seen, with 
the slow and as-yet ineffective attempts to develop 
global and regional regulations to curb land grabs, 
the struggle for recognition of customary and informal 
land and resource rights continues for African citizens. 
The global and Africa-wide efforts at regulation may 
constitute an asset in such struggles, but outcomes will 
be determined by the political economies shaping land, 
agricultural and investment policies at the national level.
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What has happened since the furore broke over the 
corporate land rush in Africa? Field-based research has 
exposed new realities that challenge the linear suggestions 
of a ‘grab’. As the process unfolds and our understanding 
deepens, the single narrative of the ‘land grab’ fractures 
into multiple messy elements. new perspectives have 
emerged, which reinforce the view that such a grab is 
underway, yet complicate our understanding of who is 
doing this, why, how, where and with what results. At the 
same time, a ‘governance rush’ has seen a proliferation 
of international frameworks that try to regulate, rather 
than stop, corporate and elite acquisitions of African land 
and water.
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